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NOTES

Joinder of Tort-Feasors In Ohio
THE problem of when tort-feasors may properly be joined in a single
action has plagued Ohio's courts for many years. The procedural advantage
of allowing joinder in a proper case is dear. The rights and liabilities of
all parties may be adjudicated in a single proceeding. The courts, however,
have been reluctant to allow joinder of parties-defendant in a tort action for
various reasons, many of which appear to be without any real justification.
Although the problem is, in essence, one of procedure, Ohio courts have
emphasized the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties involved.
Joinder has been allowed where the facts present particular substantive
patterns showing joint liability, and has been disallowed in the absence of
these patterns. This note will attempt to present the origin, growth and
use of the rules on joinder of tort feasors.
A. Introductonto the Problem
At the early common law, only technical joint tort-feasors could be
joined in a single action.1 In this strict sense of the term, in order to constitute a joint tort it was necessary that the defendants act in concert in
pursuance of a common design. 2 Because of the existence of this "conspiracy" the wrongful conduct of each was imputable to the others. They
were liable jointly and severally for the entire amount of the damage suffered by the plaintiff. Unless the petition alleged that the defandants were
joint tort-feasors in this strict sense, they were not joinable in a single action
at law.
The first Ouo case ostensibly to adopt this rule was Clark v. Fry.3 In
this case it was held that where one person directs another to do an act
which is not in itself unlawful, and the person so directing has no control
over the manner in which the act is to be done, that person is not liable to
someone injured by the performance of the act; however, if although the
act directed to be done was in itself lawful the person directing that act has
a control over the manner in which it shall be done, both are liable severally
but not jointly, and they cannot be properly joined in the same suit. It became necessary that as a condition for joinder, the court find that the defendants were jointly liable; and there could be no joint liability in tort
without concert of action. It should be noted that in the Clark case, one of
the defendants was separately relieved from liability on a substantive
ground; the court held that since this defendant had no control over the
manner in which the lawful act was to be accomplished, he could not be
1PRossER, TobT 1096 (1941); 1 COOLEY, TORTS § 73 et seq. (4th ed. 1932).
2

OPSSER, ToRis 1094 (1941).

'8 Ohio St. 358 (1858).
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liable, even under the doctrine of respondeat supertor. The statement by
the court concerning joinder was therefore dictum.
The rule with respect to joinder of defendants in a tort action, initially
advanced by the court in the Clark case, has remained substantially the same.
Although a slight relaxation of the rule has come about because of a change
in the substantive law regarding joint liability of concurrent tort-feasors,
the element of joint liability is still necessary for the allowance of a joinder.
The cases since Clark v. Fry have fallen into at least four categories:
1. The principal-agent, master-servant cases, in which the liability of
the master arises solely by operation of law under the doctrine of
respondeat superior
2. Cases in which a common duty was owed the plaintiff by the several
defendants.
3. Cases involving the respective liabilities of a negligent abuttingproperty owner and a municipal corporation.
4. Cases in which the independent wrongful acts of several tort-feasors
have concurred to produce a single indivisible injury.
B. Prmczpal-Agent, Master-Servant Situations
The courts of Ohio have consistently held that a master and his servant
may not be joined in a single action where the liability of the master arises
solely by operation of law, i.e., where because of the tortious conduct of a
servant committed while acting within the scope of his employment, the
law imposes a liability upon his master.4 Although dictum, this principle of
Clark v. Fry was followed in the case of French v. Central ConstructionCo.,'
in which a master and servant were joined in a single action, the liability of
the master being predicated solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The defendant's motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence to require plaintiff to elect was sustained by the trial court. The supreme court held that
an action against a master and servant is several and not joint where the
liability of the master arises solely by operation of law; and that an objection
is timely made and will be sustained where the absence of joint liability does
not appear upon the face of the petition but is established at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence. Clearly in issue in this case, the rule against joinder of
a master and his servant, or principal and agent was firmly established,
'French v. Cent. Construction Co., 76 Ohio St. 509, 81 N.E. 751 (1907); Clark v.
Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358 (1858); Gammel v. Sisser, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 816 (App. 1923)
At least one Ohio case has held that once an action against a principal and agent has
gone to judgment, without objection on the ground of misjoinder, this objection will
be held to have been waived. Stevenson v. Hess, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 43 (App. 1931)
'76 Ohio St. 509, 81 N.E. 751 (1907)
'In Albers v. Great Cent. Transport Corp., 74 Ohio App. 425, 59 N.E.2d 389
(1944), the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of a terminal truck transferor.
An I.C.C. regulation provided that the acts of the transferor are imputed to the car-
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An additional reason has been given by the courts in refusing to -allow a
master and servant to be joined. Aside from the ground that there can
be no joinder without joint liability the courts have held that joinder is
improper since a master is only secondarily liable, the servant being the
actual wrongdoer and the party primarily liable, and that the master would
be deprived of his right of action against the servant if joinder were allowed.
The reason given in both French, Adm'r. v. Central Constructon Co.,
and Clark v. Fry,
for denying the right to join is that the principal,
in the event he is required to pay, has a right of action against the agent to
recover for his loss resulting from the latter's wrongful act, and that right
arises because the principal is not in part delicto.:

A fortorz, if the servant is absolved from liability, no action can be maintained against the master."
Where the liability of the master arises independently and not by application of the doctrine of respondeat supertor, the courts have allowed
joinder, provided that joint liability is found to exist. Thus, when the
relationship between the defendants is that of joint adventurers in the particular transaction involved, although their relationship otherwise is that of
master and servant, joinder will be held to be proper.9
The Ohio courts have refused to allow a joinder of master and servant
then, when the liability of the master arises solely by operation of law, on
two grounds:
1. There is no joint liability.
2. The master has a right of indemnity against the servant for the
amount-of damages which he may be made to respond in favor of
the injured plaintiff.
Although some courts have followed the above rule,10 the reasons given
therefor have not provided a barrier to joinder in other jurisdictions." The
rner by whom he was hired. Although no master-servant relationship existed, the
court held that since the liability of the carrier arose solely by operation of law, it
could not be joined in an action against the transferor.
'Id. at 431, 59 N.E.2d at 392; French v. Cent. Construction Co., 76 Ohio St. 509,
81 N.E. 751 (1907); Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358 (1858).
'See Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E.2d 705 (1940).
'Wenzanski v. Allen, 51 Ohio App. 482, 1 N.E.2d 1018 (1936) Accord, Schoedler v. Motometer Gauge & Equipment Corp., 134 Ohio St. 78, 15 N.E.2d 598
(1938). And in Kaiser v. Rodenbaugh, 33 Ohio Op. 196, 68 N.E.2d 239 (Summit Com. P1. 1946), the court held that an allegation that the defendant-master was
negligent in hiring the servant is sufficient to withstand demurrer, but that plaintiff
may be required to elect upon motion if there is a failure of proof as to this allegation.
"Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Olsson, 40 Colo. 264, 90 Pac. 841 (1907)
' Bernhemer-Leader Stores, Inc. v. Burlingame, 152 Md. 284, 136 Ad. 622 (1927);
Clark v. Cliffside Park, 110 N.J.L. 589, 166 Ad. 309 (1933); Fedden v. Brooklyn
Eastern District Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N.Y. Supp. 9 (2d Dep't 1923)
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policy of preventing a circuity of actions, in any event, would appear to
outweigh any latent justification there may be for restricting joinder under
these circumstances.
C. Common Duty
second
category
into
which the cases fall are those in which the deThe
fendants owed plaintiff a common duty to exercise reasonable care for his
protection. 2 The most common illustration of such a case is the duty to
maintain a party wall. Some jurisdictions have allowed a joinder of an
abutting property owner and a municipal corporation on this ground.'3 As
will be seen later, Ohio has not chosen to follow this principle. In Board
of County Comm'rs of Warren County v. Shurts, 4 however, joinder was
held -to be proper where a village and the County Board of Commissioners
each failed to provide a guardrail at a bridge abutment, causing plaintiff's
intestate to fall to his death in a river below. The ground for this decision
'was that the defendants had breached a common duty to provide the rail as
a protection to the public.
D. Abuttng-Landowner, Municipality Situation
The third group of cases in which the problem of joinder has been met
are those involving an action against a negligent abutting-property owner
and a municipal corporation, whose liability is predicated on Ohio Revised
Code Section 723.011r (Ohio General Code Section 3714), which imposes
a duty upon the municipality to keep its streets free from nuisance. Ohio
courts have refused to allow joinder under these circumstances on the ground
that the liability of the abutting-property owner is primary while that of the
municipality is secondary, and also on the ground that there is no joint liability.' 6 It will be seen, therefore, that the grounds for refusing joinder in
the abutting-landowner-mumcipality cases are identical with those employed by the courts in the master-servant cases.
Some jurisdictions have allowed joinder in this situation on the ground
'See English v. Aubry, 90 Ohio App. 121, 103 N.E.2d 828 (1952) (alternative
holding); semble, Blanton v. Sisters of Charity, 82 Ohio App. 20, 79 N.E.2d 688
(1948); Board of County Comm'rs of Warren County v. Shurts, 10 Ohio App. 219
(1918)
uVeits v. Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 58 A.2d 389 (1948); Spurling v. Incorporated
Town of Stratford, 195 Iowa 1002, 191 N.W 724 (1923); Fortmeyer v. Nat. Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N.W 461 (1911)
1410 Ohio App. 219 (1918).
"Muicipal corporations shall have special power to regulate the use of the streets
and shall cause them to be kept open, in repair, and free from nuisance."
"6Hillyer v. East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772 (1951); Herron v.
Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24 N.E.2d 708 (1940); Bello v. Cleveland, 106
Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 526 (1922); Morris v. Woodburn, 57 Ohio St. 330, 48 N.E.
1097 (1897)
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that the defendants owed a common duty to the traveling public.17 This
view would appear to have some merit, since the liability of the municpality, although traceable to the wrongful conduct of the abutting-landowner,
arises from the breach of its distinct duty, imposed by statute, to keep the
streets free from nuisance. It is the failure to abate this nuisance, after
notice thereof, which gives rise to the liability of the municipality, and not
the negligence of the property owner.
E. Independent, Concu ont Tort-Feasors
Originally, Ohio courts refused to allow joinder of independent tortfeasors whose negligence concurred to produce a single indivisible injury,
on the ground that the defendants were not joint .tort-feasors in the technical sense, i.e., did not act in concert in pursuance of a common design., s
Because of the relaxation of the rules for joint liability, independent but
concurrent tort-feasors have in recent years been held joinable in a single
action at law. The case of Wery v. Self1 was the first to recognize this
principle in Ohio. Here a suit was brought against a parent for allowing
his son, aged 15, to drive a motor vehicle owned by the parent in violation
of a city ordinance. The son, as driver of the vehicle, was joined in the acnon. The court held joinder to be proper on the ground that both parties
were primarily liable, and that their separate acts of negligence concurred
in producing the injury. The court dispensed with the requirement of the
common-law that the defendants must have acted in concert in order to
give rise to joint liability. The rule has since been consistently followed by
2

our courtS.

'See note 13, supra.
" This rule was expressed by the court in Stark County AgriculturalSociety v. Brenner, 122 Ohio St. 560, 172 N.E. 659 (1930), a case in which the court said that
there could be no joint liability where the want of care of each of the defendants
was not of the same character and their acts were done without concert of action. As
in the Clark case, however, the rule as announced was not determinative of the case
before the court. Suit was brought in Stark County against a resident of that county
and a non-resident; the court first found that the resident defendant was not liable
since it owed no duty to plaintiff; hence a joint liability was not established and the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant.
The dictum with respect to the requirements for joint liability was, however, followed
in later cases. See Hudson v. Ohio Bus Line Co., 56 Ohio App. 483, 11 N.E.2d 113
(1937); Davies v. Seasley, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 607 (App. 1934); Lynch v. Pennsylvania R.R., 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 498 (Hamilton Com. Pl. 1931); Heils v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 14 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 384 (1911). But cf. Maumee Valley Ry.
& Light Co. v. Montgomery, 81 Ohio St. 426, 91 N.E. 181 (1910); Cincinnati
Street Ry. v. Murray, 53 Ohio St. 570,42 N.E. 596 (1895); Cleveland Ry. v. Heller,
15 Ohio App. 346 (1921).
"136 Ohio St. 307, 25 N.E.2d 692 (1940).
'Glass v. McCullough Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 115 N.E.2d 78 (1953);
Meyer v. Cincinnati Street Ry., 157 Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E.2d 173 (1952); Garbe v.
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F. Other Cases Involving Jotnder
In addition to the above enumerated categories, the problem of joinder
has arisen in several other instances worthy of mention. Where an action is
brought for the unlawful sale of deleterious food, the manufacturer or wholesaler may not be joined with the retailer. 21 One of the reasons given by our
courts for refusing to allow a joinder under these circumstances is that the
manufacturer or wholesaler is primarily liable, and the retailer only secondarily liable for the sale of the food. The action maintainable by the retailer
against the wholesaler is founded upon the loss of business and reputation he
may have sustained because of the sale.22 This action therefore differs
from those arising in favor of a master against his tortious servant, or in
favor of a municipal corporation against a negligent abutting-property
owner, in which cases the parties secondarily liable have a right of indemnity
for damages measured by the amount by which they have been compelled to
respond in favor of the injured party.
A second ground for refusing joinder was advanced by the courts in the
decided cases which arose before WVery v. Seff. This ground was that the
liability of the defendants differed in degree and kind, and could not therefore be considered joint. In view of the fact that this reasoning was adopted
from the common-law rule, which has since been dispensed with, it does
not appear that it could be validly asserted in a future action of this kind.
Mention should also be made of that group of cases in which suit was
brought by a non-resident plaintiff, in a county in which the cause of action
did not arise, against a resident of that county and a non-resident of such
county. Service upon the non-resident defendant 23 will be proper provided
that an allegation of joint liability is made. The question of whether a
joint liability has been alleged is therefore before the court. In several
cases an averment that the independent but concurrent negligence of the
defendants caused the plaintiff's injury, although contrary to the then prevailing rule, was held to be a sufficient allegation of joint liability.2 It Is
Halloran, 150 Ohio St. 476, 83 N.E.2d 217 (1948); Melville v. Greyhound Corp.,
94 Ohio App. 259, 115 N.E.2d 42 (1953); English v. Aubry, 90 Ohio App. 121,
103 N.E.2d 828 (1952); Davis v. Lanesky, 91 Ohio App. 125, 107 N.E.2d 919
(1951); Adams v. Lambert, 91 Ohio App. 333, 108 N.E.2d 241 (1951); Micelli
v. Hirsch, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 426, 83 N.E.2d 240 (App. 1948); semble, Blanton v.
Sisters of Charity, 82 Ohio App. 20, 79 N.E.2d 688 (1948). But cf. Larson v.
Cleveland Ry., 142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E.2d 163 (1943); Seabold v. Dayton, 56 Ohio
L. Abs. 417, 92 N.E.2d 701 (App. 1949)
'Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E.2d 734 (1938); Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935)
22Ibfd.
'Under Ohio Revised Code Section 2703.04 (Ohio General Code Section 11282).
'Maloney v. Callahan, 127 Ohio St. 387, 188 N.E. 656 (1933); Baltimore & 0.
R.R. v. Baillie, 112 Ohio St. 567, 148 N.E. 233 (1925)
In Glass v. McCullough
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doubtful, however, that any of the present rules of joint liability will be
ignored in the resident-non-resident cases.
CONCLUSION

Ohio courts have seen fit to allow joinder of defendants in a tort action
only where there exists a joint liability. It is presumed that joint liability
can be found to exist only where, because of the nature of the wrongful conduct of the defendants, or because of the nature of the resulting injury each
tort-feasor should be held liable for the full amount of the damage sustained
by the injured plaintiff. This does not mean, however, that in the absence
of such joint liability procedural difficulties, which might otherwise be
avoided, must necessarily ensue. Ohio Revised Code Section 2307.19
(Ohio General Code Section 11255) provides: "Any person may be made
a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the
plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of a question involved therein." This section is sufficiently broad
to allow joinder in the absence of joint liability, and in any of the situations
discussed above, and should be so construed. In any event, the absence or
presence of joint liability should not be made the criterion for refusing to
allow a joinder of tort-feasors.
The refusal to allow such joinder on the ground that one of the defendants is primarily liable, while the other is only secondarily liable is
equally without merit. The intimation that the party secondarily liable
would be deprived of his right of action against the party primarily liable
is without basis in law or fact.
The illogical turn which the above reasoning may take is evidenced by
Kntess v. Armour & Co., 25 a case in which the court held that there could
be no joinder without joint liability; that, therefore, if joinder were allowed
there must necessarily be joint liability; and that since there is no contribution among joint tort-feasors in Ohio, the party secondarily liable would be
deprived of his right of action against the party primarily liable.
It is submitted that by removal of these restrictive rules on joinder, a
more efficient disposal of litigation could be effected.
RUSSELL J. SPETRINO
Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 115 N.E.2d 78 (1953), the non-resident defendant
filed a motion to dismiss after a verdict was directed in favor of the resident defendant. Plaintiff contended that the objection was not timely since she (plaintiff)
had failed to allege joint liability, and that this was apparent upon the face of the
petition. The court held that since plaintiff alleged concurring acts of negligence
proximately operating and resulting in injury, joint liability was alleged; that the
action was not rightly brought, a verdict having been directed for the resident defendant; and that therefore jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant

was not acquired.
134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E.2d 734 (1938).

